Background: Austria's DSN (Directorate for State Security and Intelligence) has uncovered a Russian-led disinformation campaign targeting Ukraine.
The investigation was triggered by a spy case involving a Bulgarian national, who has since confessed. Since 2022, a cell operating in Austria had been actively spreading pro-Russian
narratives—both online and through public actions such as stickers and graffiti. The campaign also employed far-right symbols to create confusion and make it appear as though the attacks were
coming from pro-Ukrainian sources. The aim was to damage Ukraine's image in the public eye and stir up pro-Russian sentiment. This operation is considered part of Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy
and clearly follows the tradition of Soviet-era "active measures" in both method and objective.
Dietmar Pichler, Director of the Disinfo Resilience Network:
"The Russian disinformation campaign organized by a cell in Austria, uncovered by the Austrian intelligence service DSN, is remarkable for several
reasons. Firstly, it highlights that influence campaigns—not just espionage—are a serious threat. Secondly, it involved offline operations, such as false-flag "pro-Ukrainian" graffiti and
stickers. These false-flag operations aimed to portray Ukraine and its supporters as neo-Nazi. This strategy is known from the Soviet
Union and the Cold War, when Soviet active measures attempted to portray Germany as "still a Nazi country" by painting swastikas in public spaces.
The goal was to sabotage European unification and the restoration of relations between Germany and France. Speaking of France—such pro-Russian motivated false-flag operations happened there recently as well, when Stars of David were placed on walls in a Jewish neighborhood to create division and destabilization. The aim of the operations in Vienna was to undermine support for Ukraine and to demonize the victim. We need to understand that not all operations are social media trolling campaigns or fake websites: offline operations still matter—perhaps even more than before—because they can be amplified on social media platforms and websites. This especially applies to so-called "agents of influence": Moscow-aligned influential Western personas who spread Kremlin narratives, subtly or openly. It is time to expose them, no matter where they are or where they come from.
We have learned about several individuals in the U.S. who were paid to spread Russian narratives. The full list of
these people has not yet been released, and we still don’t know the full extent of how many Westerners—whether digital influencers, politicians, authors, or even professors—are receiving money
from Russia or its authoritarian partners. This needs to change.
Press Contact:
Dietmar Pichler
d.pichler@borsh.eu